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In Consider the Source, Susan Grover and Kim Piro argue for a change 
in the analysis that courts apply to determine whether actionable workplace 
harassment has occurred.  They identify a gap in current doctrine, which 
allows courts to ignore the status of the harasser as co-worker or 
supervisor.  The authors argue that harassment at the hands of a supervisor 
is necessarily more severe and pervasive than the same harassment by a co-
worker.  As a result, they recommend that the harasser's identity as a 
supervisor or co-worker be treated as a necessary consideration when 
courts assess whether actionable harassment has occurred.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
What is the difference between these two experiences? 
 Scenario 1:  You are an unskilled office worker.  A coworker tells you 
that you are not a valued employee.  The coworker then opines that 
people of your national origin are stupid. 
 Scenario 2:  You are an unskilled office worker.  Your immediate 
supervisor tells you that you are not a valued employee.  The supervisor 
then opines that people of your national origin are stupid. 
Most people find abuse1 inflicted by the boss to be more painful than abuse 
inflicted by a coworker.2  The difference3 between a supervisor’s and a 
coworker’s power to injure means that the harasser’s identity should be a 
pivotal factor in every harassment case.4  The power to injure and the 
degree of the resulting injury matter because harassment is actionable only 
if the target experiences abuse serious enough to “alter the conditions of 
[the target’s] employment.”5  Courts thus should distinguish between 
supervisors and other6 categories of abusers when gauging whether a 
target’s experience of abuse is serious enough to qualify as harassment. 
Although the victim’s experience of the conduct as abusive is an essential 
facet of proving that harassment occurred, and although the supervisory 
status of the harasser exacerbates that experience, the current analytic 
framework for assessing workplace harassment does not require courts to 
consider whether the harasser is the target’s supervisor.7  Ignoring the 
 
 1. This Essay uses the terms “abuse” and “abuser” to refer to hostile workplace conduct 
generally and one who perpetrates it.  The term “harassment” is used to refer to conduct 
relating to the legal action of harassment.  The term “harasser” is used to connote the 
individual accused of harassment, even though the individual may be innocent. 
 2. See infra Part III (describing studies that found abuse from supervisors to be more 
harmful than abuse from coworkers). 
 3. See infra Part III; notes 96–105 and accompanying text. 
 4. In this Essay, “harassment” refers to discriminatory harassment on any of the 
grounds prohibited under the federal antidiscrimination laws, including race, sex, national 
origin, religion, color, disability, and age. 
 5. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).  The law requires that the 
plaintiff meet this standard both subjectively and objectively:  the plaintiff actually 
experienced the treatment as abusive and a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s situation 
would have experienced the treatment as abusive. See id. at 21–22. 
 6. There are, of course, several types of third-party abusers, including customers and 
members of the general public.  The law analyzes co-worker abuse much as it analyzes other 
third-party abuse.  Thus, the distinctions this Essay draws between supervisor abuse and 
coworker abuse may also be drawn between supervisor abuse and third-party abuse.  For 
examples of abuse by customers and the general public, see Galdamez v. Potter, 415 F.3d 
1015 (9th Cir. 2005) and Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 7. See infra Part III.  The harasser’s status as a supervisor figures prominently at the 
stage after harassment has been assessed, when courts are determining whether the employer 
should be held vicariously liable for proven harassment. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764–65 (1998).  The formal inclusion of that status as a factor at the 
liability phase does nothing to obviate the need to consider it at the harassment assessment 
phase.  
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harasser’s supervisory role skews results in favor of employers.8  Nothing 
in U.S. Supreme Court doctrine precludes consideration of harasser identity 
when the victim’s experience is assessed, and some courts have expressly 
taken harasser identity into account.9 Most courts do not,10 however, and 
this Essay argues that they should. 
Part I of this Essay outlines the standard for hostile work environment 
harassment as defined by the Supreme Court, with particular emphasis on 
the “severe or pervasive” totality of the circumstances test.  Part II discusses 
recent cases from lower courts, which purport to apply the totality test, but 
reach erroneous results because of a failure to consider the harasser’s 
supervisory role.  Part III explains why abusive conduct is inherently both 
more severe and more pervasive when initiated by supervisors than when 
initiated by coworkers, and proposes that courts should consistently 
consider the status of the harasser as supervisor or coworker when 
evaluating the severity or pervasiveness of the alleged harasser’s conduct.  
In conclusion, Part IV advocates that the harasser’s status as supervisor be 
incorporated as an essential factor in the determination of whether 
harassment has occurred. 
I.  SUPREME COURT STANDARD 
Title VII does not mention discriminatory harassment,11 and more than 
twenty years passed between Title VII’s enactment in 1964 and the 
Supreme Court’s first recognition of a harassment cause of action in 1986.12  
The analytic framework for discriminatory harassment was another ten 
years in the making and continues to be a work in progress.13 
During Title VII’s early years, there was disagreement about if and when 
harassment claims were actionable under Title VII.14  The typical Title VII 
case involved official employer actions, such as pay discrimination or 
 
 8. See, e.g., Murphy v. City of Aventura, 616 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1277 (S.D. Fla. 2009) 
(finding that conduct at issue “lack[ed] severity” despite harasser’s supervisory role); 
Enriquez v. U.S. Cellular Corp., No. 06 C 3135, 2008 WL 4925012, at *10–15 (N.D. Ill. 
Nov. 14, 2008) (holding no hostile work environment created by supervisor harasser); 
Akonji v. Unity Healthcare, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 2d 83, 96–99 (D.D.C. 2007) (granting 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment because acts of harassment by supervisor were 
not sufficiently severe). 
 9. See, e.g., Steck v. Francis, 365 F. Supp. 2d 951, 966–75 (N.D. Iowa 2005); Hargrave 
v. County of Atlanta, 262 F. Supp. 2d 393, 416 (D.N.J. 2003). 
 10. This is most evident when courts cite coworker cases to support a conclusion that 
abuse by a supervisor did not constitute actionable harassment. See, e.g., Enriquez, 2008 WL 
4925012, at *11; Akonji, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 98. 
 11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). 
 12. See generally Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 13. This framework has been the work of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence as well as 
congressional action in 1991.  The 1991 Civil Rights Act added compensatory damages for 
cases of environmental harassment. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. 
 14. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 818–23 (1991) (discussing 
the early debates surrounding the inclusion of sexual harassment as an actionable claim 
under Title VII). 
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termination.15  Because harassment did not always involve concrete 
employer action, it was not clear whether harassment fell within the 
purview of Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination in the “terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment.”16  Most courts did allow a sex 
discrimination cause of action where employees were penalized for 
declining supervisors’ sexual advances.17  Such “quid pro quo” cases were 
deemed to meet the statutory criterion of discrimination “because of [the 
victim’s] sex”18 because they involved concrete action taken against the 
victim, arguably motivated by the victim’s sex.19  Some courts went beyond 
quid pro quo cases and also recognized discriminatory hostile environment 
claims, even in the absence of concrete employment action taken against the 
target, as long as the harassment was motivated by a protected trait, such as 
race or sex.20  Nevertheless, until 1986, there was much uncertainty about 
 
 15. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67–68 (casting aside the lower court’s more traditional view 
that an economic effect on the plaintiff’s employment was necessary to establish a claim 
under Title VII). 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (citing Henson v. Dundee, 
682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
 17. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.  “‘It is without question that sexual harassment of 
female employees in which they are asked or required to submit to sexual demands as a 
condition to obtain employment or to maintain employment or to obtain promotions falls 
within protection of Title VII.’” Id. (quoting Vinson v. Taylor, No. 78-1793, 1980 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 10676, at *23 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980)); see also B. Glenn George, Employer Liability 
for Sexual Harassment:  The Buck Stops Where?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 3–4 & nn.13–
22 (1999) (discussing the greater ease with which courts accepted a quid pro quo harassment 
cause of action under Title VII than a hostile environment cause of action). 
 18. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2010). 
 19. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 
(1998).  Schultz has written, 
Although this sexual desire-dominance paradigm represented progress when it was 
first articulated as the foundation for quid pro quo sexual harassment, using the 
paradigm to conceptualize hostile work environment harassment has served to 
exclude from legal understanding many of the most common and debilitating 
forms of harassment faced by women (and many men) at work each day.  The 
prevailing paradigm privileges conduct thought to be motivated by sexual 
designs—such as sexual advances—as the core sex- or gender-based harassment.  
Yet much of the gender-based hostility and abuse that women (and some men) 
endure at work is neither driven by the desire for sexual relations nor even sexual 
in content. 
Id. at 1686–87 (citations omitted).  For a discussion of “courts’ initial reluctance to hold that 
supervisors’ demands for sexual favors occurred ‘because of sex’ within the meaning of the 
statute,” see id. at 1689. 
  It should be noted that there is good reason to believe that sexual advances by a 
superior against an inferior employee originate from a goal of oppression of the subordinate, 
exerting power and maintaining a status quo of subordination, rather than from motivation 
based upon sex. See John W. Whitehead, Eleventh Hour Amendment or Serious Business:  
Sexual Harassment and The United States Supreme Court’s 1997–1998 Term, 71 TEMP. L. 
REV. 773, 784–86 (1998) (discussing sexual harassment as an abuse of authority rooted in 
dominance rather than desire).  Nevertheless, most courts assume hostile conduct of a sexual 
nature to be “because of sex.” See Veronica Diaz, Note, Playing Favorites in the Workplace:  
Widespread Sexual Favoritism as Actionable Discrimination Under Miller v. Department of 
Corrections, 16 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 165, 189–90 (2006) (citing relevant cases). 
 20. The courts’ ultimate acceptance of sexually hostile environment claims was 
predicated on their well-established acceptance of racially hostile environment claims. See 
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allowing a Title VII claim for hostile environment harassment in the 
absence of economic harm.21  In the 1986 case of Meritor Savings Bank, 
FSB v. Vinson,22 the Supreme Court recognized the hostile environment 
cause of action.23 
Mechelle Vinson sued under Title VII for discriminatory harassment, 
even though her harassing supervisor had not taken official adverse action 
against her.24  Vinson complained that her supervisor, Sidney Taylor, 
“made repeated demands upon her for sexual favors . . . fondled her in front 
of other employees, followed her into the women’s restroom when she went 
there alone, exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several 
occasions.”25  The defendant bank26 argued that harassment claims were 
cognizable only if the plaintiff had experienced economic harm.27  The 
Supreme Court rejected that argument, concluding that a hostile 
environment is injury enough to violate the Title VII prohibition against 
discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment.28  The Court 
distinguished such environmental claims from “quid pro quo” harassment 
cases, in which a supervisor threatens to take job-related action against the 
victim, but recognized both as actionable under Title VII.29 
 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (citing race and national-origin 
cases upon which the Meritor Court predicated recognition of an environmental sexual 
harassment claim). 
 21. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 938–39 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (reversing lower 
court’s holding that “sexual harassment does not in itself represent discrimination ‘with 
respect to . . . terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ within the meaning of Title 
VII”).  Prior to Meritor, although courts had recognized hostile environment racial 
harassment cases, they had not uniformly recognized hostile environment sex-motivated 
harassment. See, e.g., Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238 (“One can readily envision working 
environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional 
and psychological stability of [racial] minority group workers, and I think . . . Title VII was 
aimed at the eradication of such noxious practices.”). 
 22. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 23. Id. at 73. 
 24. Id. at 64. 
 25. Id. at 60. 
 26. Under Title VII, claims are cognizable against the employer, not the individual 
wrongdoer. See Wilson v. Wayne County, 856 F. Supp. 1254, 1264–65 (M.D. Tenn. 1994). 
 27. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.  Interestingly, Vinson took indefinite sick leave because of 
the harassment and then was discharged by the bank for excessive use of that leave, but there 
were no allegations of constructive discharge. Id. at 60.  For later Supreme Court case law on 
constructive discharge in harassment cases, see Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 
U.S. 129 (2004).  Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).  The Meritor Court concluded that “terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment” include the environment in which employees work 
and therefore if that environment is discriminatorily hostile or abusive, Title VII is violated. 
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63–67. 
 28. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73. 
 29. Id. at 65–67.  In modern parlance, most discriminatory harassment is of the hostile 
environment variety.  The alternative theory, “quid pro quo” harassment, is actionable when 
the employee undergoes adverse employment action for failing to submit to a supervisor’s 
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In Meritor, the Court thus began the process of delineating the contours 
of actionable harassment.  Specifically, the Court established the “severe or 
pervasive” standard that endures as an essential element of the hostile 
environment claim.30  It tied this standard directly to the statutory language 
of Title VII, announcing that, “[f]or sexual harassment to be actionable, it 
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the 
victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’”31 
Some lower courts construed this new standard grudgingly.  They 
required plaintiffs to prove both severity and pervasiveness (even though 
the test had been articulated in the disjunctive), document psychological 
injury, or show some other additional harm.32  Additionally, courts often 
refused to recognize gender-motivated harassment unless it was sexual in 
nature.33  Summary judgment for an employer was common when a 
plaintiff’s allegations did not involve “unwelcome sexual advances or other 
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.”34 
 
sexual demands. See Diaz, supra note 19, at 183 (explaining the differences between “quid 
pro quo” claims and hostile environment claims). 
 30. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.  Today, in order to establish a case of hostile environment 
discriminatory harassment, the plaintiff must prove four elements.  First, the plaintiff must 
have been subjected to unwelcome conduct. See id. at 68 (“The gravamen of any sexual 
harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were ‘unwelcome.’”).  Second, the 
conduct must have been sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the 
victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment. See Harris v. Forklift 
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).  Third, the work environment must have been objectively 
hostile or abusive and the victim must have subjectively perceived the environment as 
hostile or abusive. See id. at 21–22.  Fourth, the victim must have possessed a trait protected 
by Title VII and the conduct must have been based on this trait. See Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998). 
  The elements are the same regardless of whether the motive for the harassment is the 
victim’s sex, race, age, disability, or other protected trait. See, e.g., Miller v. Kenworth of 
Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002) (applying the standard in a harassment 
claim by Mexican-Americans).  Doctrines developed under Title VII are generally 
transferable to all traits protected by Title VII and also to traits protected by other statutory 
schemes.  Courts sometimes move the order around a bit—for example, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has required the employee to show that (1) she belongs to a 
protected group, (2) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) the harassment 
was based on sex, (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of her 
employment, and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in 
question and failed to take prompt remedial action. See Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns, 
L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 
1245 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
 31. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th 
Cir. 1982)).  The Court concluded that Vinson’s allegations, which included acts of rape, 
stated a claim for “hostile environment” sexual harassment. Id. 
 32. See Heather L. Kleinschmidt, Note, Reconsidering Severe or Pervasive:  Aligning 
the Standard in Sexual Harassment and Racial Harassment Causes of Action, 80 IND. L.J. 
1119, 1124–29 (2005) (discussing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation of the standard as “severe and pervasive” rather than “severe or pervasive”); 
see also Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (finding error in the lower court’s requirement of 
demonstrating psychological harm to establish a hostile work environment cause of action). 
 33. See Schultz, supra note 19, at 1716–20. 
 34. Id. at 1718 (citation omitted). 
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The Supreme Court revisited the legal standards for harassment in 1993 
in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.35  Harris affirmed Meritor’s severe or 
pervasive standard.36  As with the Meritor holding, however, lower courts 
have sometimes exaggerated the limits that Harris imposes on the 
plaintiff’s case.37 
Theresa Harris’s supervisor repeatedly insulted Harris because she was a 
woman.  His verbal abuse included calling Harris “a dumb ass woman” and 
making statements such as, “You’re a woman, what do you know?” and 
“We need a man as the rental manager.”38  In addition to these nonsexual 
(but gender-motivated) insults, the supervisor engaged in inappropriate 
sexual antics and comments.39  He publicly suggested to Harris that the two 
of them should “‘go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [Harris’s] raise.’”40  He 
asked “female employees to get coins from his front pants pocket” and 
“threw objects on the ground, [asking the women] to pick the objects up.”41  
He also made sexual innuendos about the clothing worn by Harris and other 
women.42 
The lower court rejected Harris’s claim of hostile environment 
harassment because the abuse had not caused secondary effects.43  The 
court found that “some of [the supervisor’s] comments ‘offended [Harris], 
and would offend the reasonable woman,’” but were not severe enough to 
constitute harassment.44 
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the lower court’s requirement that 
secondary effects be shown.45  Although psychological harm and 
interference with work performance may be relevant to a showing of 
harassment, the Court stated, they are not necessary to that showing.46  The 
 
 35. 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
 36. Id. at 21–22. 
 37. See, e.g., Lakshman v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 328 F. Supp. 2d 92, 112 (D. Me. 2004) 
(finding the facts in the case “different in degree and kind” from the Harris case); Stoeckel 
v. Envtl. Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1106, 1115 (D.D.C. 1995) (declining to find the 
harasser’s conduct sufficiently egregious). 
 38. Harris, 510 U.S. at 19 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 20 (describing secondary effects as harm to Harris’s psychological well-being 
or interference with her work performance). 
 44. Id. (quoting the appendix to the plaintiff’s petition for certiorari).  The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court in an unpublished opinion. See 
generally Harris v. Forklift Sys., Nos. 91-5301, 91-5871 and 91-5822, 1992 WL 229300 (6th 
Cir. Sept. 17, 1992). 
 45. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. 
 46. Id. at 23.  Prior to Harris, some had argued that a showing of interference with work 
performance should be required. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 
1986).  In Harris, Justice Scalia noted that such a test would have been preferable, but was 
not consistent with precedent. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 24–25 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Like 
psychological injury, however, a showing of interference with work performance might be a 
sufficient, though not necessary, condition to finding that harassment had occurred. See id. at 
22–23 (majority opinion). 
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Harris Court emphasized that the environment itself—without any showing 
that the environment caused secondary effects—constitutes a violation of 
Title VII.47  To assess the environment, the Supreme Court explained, 
courts should ask simply whether the harassment was sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to cause the target to have reasonably experienced the challenged 
conduct as abusive such that it altered the conditions of employment.48 
To determine whether treatment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to be 
experienced as abusive, the Court admonished lower courts to consider “all 
the circumstances,”49 in essence reiterating the “totality of the 
circumstances” test of Meritor.50  Although the Supreme Court emphasized 
that courts should focus on a myriad of factors,51 the Court also itemized 
some specific factors for courts to consider:  “frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or 
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably 
interferes with an employee’s work performance.”52 
Although the Harris Court offered these as merely exemplary, some 
lower courts have treated them as a list of requirements, the absence of any 
one of which can defeat a plaintiff’s claim.53  This practice of requiring that 
 
 47. The Court stated: 
A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously 
affect employees’ psychological well-being, can and often will detract from 
employees’ job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or 
keep them from advancing in their careers.  Moreover, even without regard to 
these tangible effects, the very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so severe 
or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees because of 
their race, gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII’s broad rule of 
workplace equality.  The appalling conduct alleged in Meritor, and the reference in 
that case to environments “so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy 
completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers,” 
merely present some especially egregious examples of harassment.  They do not 
mark the boundary of what is actionable. 
Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
 48. See id. at 21.  Otherwise, the Court wrote, “the conduct has not actually altered the 
conditions of the victim’s employment.” Id. at 21–22. 
 49. Id. at 23. 
 50. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986). 
 51. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.  In Meritor, the Court cited with approval language from 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines regarding the need to 
look at the “totality of the circumstances” when evaluating a claim for sexual harassment. 
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69. 
 52. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. 
 53. See, e.g., Kleinschmidt, supra note 32, at 1129 (discussing courts’ requirement of 
both severity and pervasiveness). See generally Elisabeth A. Keller & Judith B. Tracy, 
Hidden in Plain Sight:  Achieving More Just Results in Hostile Work Environment Sexual 
Harassment Cases by Re-Examining Supreme Court Precedent, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 247 (2008).  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has found that a 
plaintiff’s claim against her employer could not survive summary judgment because “a few 
inappropriate comments and an unwanted slow dance do not amount to particularly severe 
conduct that was threatening or humiliating.” Hocevar v. Purdue Frederick Co., 223 F.3d 
721, 738 (8th Cir. 2000).  While the supervisor’s behavior may not have altered the 
plaintiff’s work environment, the Eighth Circuit clearly misstated the appropriate standard 
by requiring conduct to be threatening or humiliating. See Keller & Tracy, supra, at 258–59 
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the case meet each factor as if they were elements in a claim has been used 
to support a finding of no harassment in very severe cases and very 
pervasive cases.  Courts, for example, determine that abuse was severe, but 
reject the claim because it is not also pervasive.54  Sometimes courts have 
rejected claims of harassment where the abuse was clearly severe because 
the abuse was not physically threatening or humiliating.55  In fact, the third 
and fourth items in the Harris list are logical, relevant factors to consider in 
deciding whether the first two factors have been met.56  Requiring a 
plaintiff to prove every item in this list of factors imposes a burden far 
heavier than the Court intended in either Meritor or Harris,57 and it 
distracts from the actual totality of the circumstances test for assessing 
whether abuse was severe or pervasive.  Harris did nothing to alter the 
Meritor requirement that actionable harassment be found as long as the 
abuse is severe or pervasive, although it has been treated as narrowing it.  
The crucial question of the harasser’s supervisory status has been one 
casualty of the courts’ disinclination to apply a true totality of the 
circumstances test. 
In the Supreme Court’s next encounter with the issue, the Court 
reemphasized the breadth and malleability of the totality test.  In Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,58 the Court recalled that it had 
previously 
emphasized . . . that the objective severity of harassment should be judged 
from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, 
considering “all the circumstances” [in an] inquiry requir[ing] careful 
consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs 
and is experienced by its target. . . .  The real social impact of workplace 
behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, 
 
(stating that the Harris Court “listed factors which may be considered,” including “whether it 
is physically threatening or humiliating”). 
 54. See Keller & Tracy, supra note 53, at 258 & n.78; see also id. at 262 (courts use 
pervasiveness as a threshold before getting to the severity issue). 
 55. See Webb-Edwards v. Orange Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 525 F.3d 1013, 1016–17, 
1027–28 (11th Cir. 2008) (awarding summary judgment to defendant where supervisor told 
plaintiff she “‘looked hot’” and “should wear tighter clothes” and told her husband that he 
was eating her for lunch, finding that the conduct was neither physically threatening nor 
humiliating and not sufficiently severe). 
 56. It is risky to parse the language of a court decision the way we parse statutory text, 
since the former has not run the gauntlet designed to achieve the precision of meaning that 
lawyers ascribe to the latter.  Nevertheless, the text of Harris is both inconsistent with 
Meritor and also internally incongruous (since the plain meaning of severe encompasses the 
notion of physically threatening).  For this reason, what are ostensibly four co-equal factors, 
separated by semicolons, should be read so that the last two items are examples of ways that 
the elements of (1) pervasiveness and (2) severity may be met. But cf. Keller & Tracy, supra 
note 53, at 257 (stating that the Supreme Court precedents provide “explicit guidance”).  The 
Harris factors listed all go to the question of whether the conduct is severe or pervasive—
i.e., the punctuation is erroneous. See Keller & Tracy, supra note 53, at 259. 
 57. Perhaps some of the confusion has arisen from the use of semicolons to separate the 
four listed items—two of those items being the alternative requirements of severe or 
pervasive, and the other two being ways of assessing severe or pervasive. 
 58. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
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expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple 
recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.  Common 
sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts 
and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing . . . and 
conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find 
severely hostile or abusive.59 
Although the Court espoused a broad, context-sensitive approach, it did not 
expressly impose a requirement that courts consider the status of the abuser 
as the target’s supervisor.60 
In a slightly different context, the Supreme Court has recognized the 
qualitative distinction between abuse by coworkers and abuse by 
supervisors.61  The distinction is a crucial factor in the Court’s 
determination of whether employers should be liable for harassment once 
the harassment itself has been proven.62  In cases where the harasser is a 
supervisor, the employer is automatically liable for that harassment (unless 
there is an applicable affirmative defense);63 in cases where the harasser is a 
coworker, the employer is liable only if the plaintiff proves that the 
employer was negligent in failing to discover and correct the harassment.64  
The Court’s decision to treat liability in this fashion hinged largely on 
principles of agency law.65 
In the more preliminary context of gauging whether harassment has 
occurred to begin with, however, the Court has been silent on the 
distinction between supervisors and coworkers.  Instead, as described 
above, its doctrine is put more broadly, in the “totality of the 
circumstances” test.66  This Essay argues that the totality of the 
circumstances test cannot be applied without considering whether the 
alleged harasser is the target’s supervisor.  The courts’ consideration of 
harasser identity at the subsequent phase of assessing employer liability for 
 
 59. Id. at 81–82. 
 60. Id. at 81. 
 61. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998) (“[A] supervisor’s 
power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular threatening 
character . . . .”). 
 62. There are several distinct questions at issue.  First, the courts look to whether a 
plaintiff has established that harassment occurred.  The courts next ask whether the harasser 
is someone for whose acts the employer or institution may be held legally responsible.  This 
inquiry determines whether there are any defenses the employer or institution may assert, as 
different defenses apply for supervisory and coworker harassment.  This Essay focuses on 
the first question, the determination of whether harassment has occurred. 
 63. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 745–46, 766. 
 64. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799 (1998) (noting that lower 
courts “uniformly judg[e] employer liability for co-worker harassment under a negligence 
standard”). 
 65. See, e.g., Burlington, 524 U.S. at 754–55 (stating that Congress intended for the use 
of agency principles in applying Title VII); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 797 (applying basic 
principles of agency law to determine whether harassing conduct falls within the “scope of 
employment”). 
 66. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986). 
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proven harassment does not obviate the need to weigh harasser identity at 
the juncture when the court determines whether harassment took place. 
II.  LOWER COURTS’ APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD—FINDING NO 
SEVERITY IN SEVERE CASES AND NO PERVASIVENESS IN PERVASIVE CASES 
The Hancock v. Barron Builders67 case is a good example of supervisor 
harassment that clearly is both severe and pervasive, but that is found by the 
trial court to be neither.68  Hancock involved three female plaintiffs who 
alleged that their supervisor created a hostile work environment.69  Over 
periods ranging from three to six months, the supervisor made over 100 
offensive comments and gestures to the plaintiffs.70  According to the 
plaintiffs, the supervisor described the use of sex toys, demonstrated which 
sexual positions he preferred, discussed the sexual relations he had with his 
wife, talked about videotaping his sexual encounters, talked about the 
number of sex partners he had and the occasions on which he had sex, 
graphically described situations in which he date-raped women in college, 
and asked for money to use at an exotic dancing establishment.71  Two of 
the victims resigned from their positions in response to the harassment.72  
Yet, the court found that the abuse was not sufficiently severe or pervasive 
to meet the Meritor/Harris standard.73 
The egregiousness of the abuse that the court found not to constitute 
harassment makes Hancock remarkable, but the case is especially 
noteworthy for another reason.  In concluding that the abuse by a supervisor 
was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute harassment, the 
Hancock court relied on precedent involving harassment by a coworker.74  
The court was oblivious to the reality that what may be legally acceptable at 
the hands of a coworker very often is not acceptable coming from the boss. 
Equally interesting is Webb-Edwards v. Orange County Sheriff’s 
Office.75  Shortly after Richard Mankewich was assigned to supervise 
Elaine Webb-Edwards, Mankewich began making inappropriate 
 
 67. Hancock v. Barron Builders & Mgmt. Co., 523 F. Supp. 2d 571 (S.D. Tex. 2007). 
 68. See generally id.  For similarly egregious abuse found not to be harassment, see 
Gibson v. Potter, 264 F. App’x 397 (5th Cir. 2008); Thornhill v. Finley, Inc., No. CIV.A.07-
1033, 2008 WL 4344887 (W.D. La. Sept. 23, 2008); Davenport v. City of Columbus, No. 
4:06-CV-150 (CDL), 2008 WL 2902077 (M.D. Ga. July 23, 2008); Akonji v. Unity 
Healthcare, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 2007); Smith v. America Online, Inc., 499 F. 
Supp. 2d 1251 (M.D. Fla. 2007). 
 69. See Hancock, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 572. 
 70. Id. at 574.  The supervisor in question was both the company president and owner. 
Id. at 572. 
 71. Id. at 573–74. 
 72. Id. at 572. 
 73. Id. at 575. 
 74. Id. at 576 (citing Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th 
Cir. 1999)).  In Shepherd, plaintiff alleged that a coworker had harassed her through sexually 
explicit comments and physical contact.  The Fifth Circuit concluded that the coworker’s 
behavior did not create a hostile working environment. Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 874. 
 75. 525 F.3d 1013 (11th Cir. 2008). 
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comments.76  On at least a weekly basis, Mankewich commented that 
Webb-Edwards “‘looked hot’” and should wear tighter clothing.77  On one 
occasion, when the plaintiff and Mankewich were driving to take a 
witness’s statement, Mankewich made a comment about “eating Ms. Webb-
Edwards for lunch.”78  When plaintiff told Mankewich “that his comments 
made her feel uncomfortable,” he told her that if she reported him, she 
would not “be getting any other position.”79  The court agreed that 
Mankewich’s comments “were taunting and boorish,” but, relying on the 
Harris list of factors, concluded that the comments did not constitute 
harassment because “[t]hey were not . . . physically threatening or 
humiliating” and did not involve physical touching.80  The court, fifteen 
years after the Supreme Court’s Harris decision, also relied on the absence 
of any showing that the abuse interfered with the plaintiff’s work 
performance and noted that most of the comments did not refer to sexual 
activity.81  The Webb-Edwards court clearly set the bar for plaintiffs too 
high.  What might have been merely “taunting and boorish” coming from a 
coworker becomes harassment when the source has the power to tell the 
target that she “will not be getting any other position” if she reports the 
abuse. 
Other examples of supervisors’ verbal statements that federal courts have 
deemed not severe enough to alter the conditions of employment include 
direct sexual propositions in exchange for money,82 use of the words 
“hooker,” “slut,” and “whore” to describe an employee’s appearance,83 and 
other sexually suggestive inquiries (e.g., whether plaintiff was the “fooling 
around type”84 and how wide plaintiff could open her mouth85).  Coming 
from a coworker, such comments are, at a minimum, offensive.  Coming 
from a supervisor, they are—for the reasons set forth below—legal 
harassment. 
Among the most egregious harassment cases, those involving unwanted 
physical contact, the federal courts often fail to recognize the heightened 
 
 76. Id. at 1016. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1027.  This comment was actually made by telephone to plaintiff’s spouse.  
Plaintiff’s “husband telephoned her, and asked her if she had lunch plans.  Before she could 
reply, Sgt. Mankewich grabbed the telephone and told her husband:  ‘I don’t know what 
you’re saying, but I’m eating your wife.’” Id. at 1017.  Mankewich had also commented that 
he thought that “women who dye their hair have issues at home.” Id. at 1027. 
 79. Id. at 1017. 
 80. Id. at 1027. 
 81. Id. at 1027–28. 
 82. See Thornhill v. Finley, Inc., No. CIV.A.07-1033, 2008 WL 4344887, at *1 (W.D. 
La. Sept. 23, 2008) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding the 
plaintiff’s quid pro quo claim and granting the motion regarding the plaintiff’s hostile work 
environment claim). 
 83. See Murphy v. City of Aventura, 616 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1277 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (no 
quid pro quo claim asserted in this case, only hostile work environment and retaliation). 
 84. See Thornhill, 2008 WL 4344887, at *1. 
 85. See Davenport v. City of Columbus, No. 4:06-CV-150 (CDL), 2008 WL 2902077, 
at *7 (M.D. Ga. July 23, 2008). 
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severity from the employee’s perspective when the physical assault comes 
from a supervisor, rather than a coworker.  In these, as in verbal abuse 
cases, courts frequently rely on precedents involving coworker physical 
harassment situations.86 
The case of Enriquez v. United States Cellular Corp.87 is a good 
example.  There, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
awarded the employer summary judgment against four female employees 
who brought a hostile environment claim against their employer.88  The 
plaintiffs alleged that their supervisor made three attempts to kiss two of 
them in his office, lifted one of them “by the outside of her thighs and 
called her ‘juicy’” on two occasions, and lifted one of the plaintiffs off a 
table and pulled her legs around his waist at a coworker’s Christmas 
party.89  In concluding that such behavior failed to alter the conditions of 
employment, the court relied, in part, on precedents involving coworker 
harassment.90 
Similarly, in Akonji v. Unity Healthcare, Inc.,91 the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia failed to distinguish between supervisor and 
coworker conduct.  The Akonji court concluded that a supervisor’s conduct 
was not sufficiently severe where the male supervisor allegedly hugged and 
tried to kiss his female subordinate on two occasions, touched her behind 
once, and touched her thigh on another occasion.92  In its severity analysis, 
the Akonji court cited the case of Adusumilli v. City of Chicago,93 where 
“four isolated incidents in which a coworker briefly touched the plaintiff’s 
fingers, arm, or buttocks did not amount to a hostile work environment.”94  
 
 86. See, e.g., Enriquez v. U.S. Cellular Corp., No. 06 C 3135, 2008 WL 4925012 (N.D. 
Ill. Nov. 14, 2008).  Jurisdictions are split as to whether one instance of inappropriate 
physical contact is sufficient to establish severity. Compare Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 
229 F.3d 917, 921, 926–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that one incident where a coworker 
fondled the plaintiff’s breasts at work was not sufficient to support a hostile work 
environment claim), with Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1072 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(“disagree[ing] with defendants’ assertions that a single incident of physically threatening 
conduct can never be sufficient to create an abusive environment”). 
 87. No. 06 C 3135, 2008 WL 4925012 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2008). 
 88. See id. at *1. 
 89. See id. at *1–3. 
 90. See id. at *11 (finding that defendant supervisor’s conduct toward one of the 
plaintiffs did not rise to the level of severity required to establish a hostile working 
environment and supporting this finding with three cases involving coworker harassment 
claims). 
 91. 517 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 92. See id. at 88, 91.  The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine recently cited this 
case for support.  The opinion noted, however, that the Akonji decision was “surprising.” See 
Lacadie v. Town of Milford, Civ. No. 07-101-B-W, 2008 WL 1930410, at n.11 (D. Me. 
May 1, 2008). 
 93. 164 F.3d 353 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 94. Akonji, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 98 (citing Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 
361 (7th Cir. 1998)).  The Akonji court also cited Shepherd v. Comptroller of Public 
Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999), and Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.3d 
654, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1999), both of which involve instances of coworker harassment. 
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Using this coworker case as support, the Akonji court found that the 
supervisor’s conduct was not severe or pervasive.95 
On the other hand, some courts have expressly acknowledged that abuse 
at the hands of a supervisor is inherently more severe than coworker 
abuse.96  In Dandy v. UPS,97 for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit acknowledged that “‘a supervisor’s use of [a racial epithet] 
impacts the work environment far more severely than use by co-equals.’”98  
Similarly, under parallel New Jersey state law, courts expressly cite the 
harasser’s supervisory status as a factor weighing in favor of finding 
severity or pervasiveness of harassment.99 
The Supreme Court has supplied guidance, but lower courts diverge from 
the path.100  Commentators argue that lower courts are too eager to take 
harassment cases from the jury, both at summary judgment and after 
verdict.101  They attribute this overzealousness to a constrained reading of 
the Supreme Court standards for actionable harassment.102  Although courts 
recognize the totality of the circumstances standard, some are quick to 
dismiss cases that do not make a strong showing on every factor.103  Yet, 
even among these commentators, there has been almost complete silence on 
the glaring absence from many court decisions of what should be the central 
question in harassment cases:  who is doing the harassing?104  Courts 
should be more circumspect in taking harassment cases from the jury, and 
 
 95. Akonji, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 98; see also Murphy v. City of Aventura, 616 F. Supp. 2d 
1267, 1277 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (also citing Adusumilli, 164 F.3d at 357, 361–62, to support its 
conclusion regarding the lack of severity of a supervisor’s conduct). 
 96. See infra Part III (demonstrating how some courts have recognized that the 
employer/employee power differential gives supervisors power to damage the workplace). 
 97. 388 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 98. Id. at 271 (quoting Rodgers v. W.-S. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
 99. See Hargrave v. County of Atlanta, 262 F. Supp. 2d 393, 414 n.10 (D.N.J. 2003); id. 
at 416 (recognizing that “as the New Jersey Supreme Court has observed, a jury could 
reasonably conclude that the impact and severity of [the harasser]’s conduct was aggravated 
by the fact that he was a member of the management staff with direct responsibility for 
supervising Plaintiff’s work performance”); see also Durling v. Santiago, Civil No. 04-3777 
(AET), 2007 WL 2027929, at *5 (D.N.J. July 10, 2007) (citing Hargrave, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 
416). 
 100. See Keller & Tracy, supra note 53, at 250. 
 101. See id. at 248–49, and works cited therein (notes 12 through 14 are particularly 
illuminating). 
 102. Some courts require plaintiffs to prove both severity and pervasiveness. See 
Kleinschmidt, supra note 32, at 1125. 
 103. Rather than consider the totality of the circumstances, courts seek a litmus test to 
resolve the issue.  Frequently, that test is simply whether the conduct was physically 
threatening or humiliating—in essence, requiring that the plaintiff demonstrate behavior so 
egregious that the abuser might well be subject to criminal sanctions for it. Judith Johnson, 
License To Harass Women:  Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment To Be 
“Severe or Pervasive” Discriminates Among “Terms and Conditions” of Employment, 62 
MD. L. REV. 85, 111 (2003). 
 104. Courts do make this distinction when analyzing employer liability. See supra note 7.  
However, this analysis takes place after a determination of whether harassment has occurred.  
While all courts consider the identity of the harasser at the liability phase of analysis, most 
do not take this into account in their determination of whether the harasser has created a 
hostile work environment for the plaintiff. 
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they will become more circumspect if they consistently account for the 
heightened harm incurred where the harasser is the target’s supervisor.  The 
most important correction needed in the application of doctrine to facts is 
recognition of the prominent role that the alleged harasser’s identity as a 
supervisor plays in a target’s experience of harassment.105 
III.  WHY SUPERVISOR HARASSMENT IS WORSE 
Many of us know intuitively that supervisory harassment exceeds 
coworker harassment in its capacity to harm.  Most obviously, the power 
differential between supervisor and subordinate causes the subordinate to 
experience supervisor abuse as more serious than coworker abuse.  In 
addition, the authoritative/fiduciary stature of the supervisor exacerbates the 
harm done.  Finally, the locus in the hierarchy occupied by the supervisor 
generally means that supervisor harassment pervades the workplace more 
easily and more thoroughly than coworker harassment.  It thus more readily 
satisfies the “pervasive” prong of the Supreme Court standard.  This part of 
the Essay focuses on the three sources of exacerbation:  power differential, 
authority/fiduciary factors, and locus in the hierarchy contributing to 
pervasiveness. 
The power differential between the harassing supervisor and targeted 
subordinate exacerbates the harm experienced by the subordinate.106  Such 
an impact is present whether the harassment is quid pro quo or hostile 
environment.  Because power differentials have the capacity to worsen107 
the target’s experience of the abuse, courts can accurately gauge the target’s 
experience only by considering the special power that supervisors possess 
to harm subordinates.108 
 
 105. The failure to account for harasser identity when actionable harassment is assessed 
contributes to courts’ “needless discomfort with how to evaluate conduct” and “an 
unjustified number of summary dispositions for defendants and vacated jury determinations 
for plaintiffs.” Keller & Tracy, supra note 53, at 256.  Other prominent needs include that of 
recognizing that sex-motivated harassment need not be sexual. See Schultz, supra note 19, at 
1716–20. 
 106. See Rebecca A. Thacker & Stephan F. Gohmann, Emotional and Psychological 
Consequences of Sexual Harassment:  A Descriptive Study, 130 J. PSYCHOL. 429, 439 (1996) 
(supporting the idea that “sexual harassment from supervisors is a political tactic designed to 
assert dominance and authority”). 
 107. Or ameliorate, if the abuser is the target’s subordinate. 
 108. Power differentials are actually a theoretical underpinning for the harassment cause 
of action.  The policies and theories underlying harassment doctrine grew out of the work of 
Catharine MacKinnon, and other feminists, whose theories envision the power differential as 
a hallmark of harassment at work. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN:  A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979); Joanna L. 
Grossman, The Culture of Compliance:  The Final Triumph of Form Over Substance in 
Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 34–35, 35 n.192 (2003) (describing 
theoretical approaches to power as a basis of harassment and citing articles on role of power 
differential in workplace harassment); Thacker & Gohmann, supra note 106, at 439 (citing 
Rebecca A. Thacker & Gerald R. Ferris, Understanding Sexual Harassment in the 
Workplace:  The Influence of Power and Politics Within the Dyadic Interaction of Harasser 
and Target, 1 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. REV. 23 (1991)); Louise Feld, Comment, Along the 
Spectrum of Women’s Rights Advocacy:  A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Sexual 
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In Emotional and Psychological Consequences of Sexual Harassment:  A 
Descriptive Study,109 researchers reported that “armed with organizational 
legitimacy, the [supervisor who harasses] has power over the target in two 
ways that are meaningful for a prediction of effects on individuals’ 
psychological states”110:  (1) the target is dependent on the supervisor for 
performance ratings, salary increases, and flexible work scheduling,111 and 
(2) the supervisor can threaten sanctions for the target’s refusal to 
submit.112  Based on these factors, the researchers concluded that the 
responses of targets of harassment would be more negative when the 
harassment is from supervisors rather than from coworkers.113 
In Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment:  A Multivariate 
Analysis,114 researchers similarly found that targets experience harassment 
from a supervisor differently from how they experience that from a 
coworker.115  Women who experience harassment from supervisors are 
especially limited in their responses; they not only opt for less assertive 
responses, but are also forced out of their jobs at a much higher rate than 
women harassed by peers.116  The study suggested that “women are more 
able to adapt a wider range of responses when the source does not have 
more organizational power” than the target.117  Thus, women are more 
likely to confront or report harassers who do not have supervisory power 
over them.118  Alternatively, targets whose harassers are supervisors tend to 
experience “worsening . . . feelings about work”119 and are ultimately more 
likely to leave.120 
Steck v. Francis121 is one of the few cases to have recognized the 
essential importance of this power differential to harassment analysis.122  
 
Harassment Law in the United States and India, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1205, 1233–36 
(2002). 
 109. Thacker & Gohmann, supra note 106. 
 110. Id. at 430. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. at 436–39.  Although psychological injury is not a requirement in harassment 
cases, the degree of harm experienced is relevant to assessing whether the target experiences 
the abuse as interfering with the work environment. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 
U.S. 17, 22–23 (1993). 
 114. James E. Gruber & Michael D. Smith, Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment:  
A Multivariate Analysis, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 543 (1995). 
 115. See generally id. 
 116. See id. at 554. 
 117. Id. at 558. 
 118. Id. at 547, 556; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998) 
(stating that “the victim may well be reluctant to accept the risks of blowing the whistle on a 
superior”); Mariejoy Mendoza, Note, Making Friends:  Sexual Harassment in the 
Workplace, Free Speech, and Lyle v. Warner Bros., 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1963, 1988 
(2007) (claiming that “economic dependence” makes subordinate employees less likely to 
confront their harassers). 
 119. Thacker & Gohmann, supra note 106, at 436. 
 120. Gruber & Smith, supra note 114, at 554. 
 121. 365 F. Supp. 2d 951 (N.D. Iowa 2005). 
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The Steck court explicitly found that “status of the harasser is a ‘relevant 
factor’” in the “all the circumstances” test.123  The court also recognized 
that “[a]s the harasser moves higher in the hierarchy of the employer, 
incidents of harassment become proportionally more severe.”124  In Steck, 
the court acknowledged that a harassment victim may have more difficulty 
objecting to abuse from a supervisor rather than a coworker due to the 
nature of the supervisor-employee relationship.125  The court concluded that 
it was fair to assume that the abuser’s high status rendered the abuse 
upsetting enough to interfere with plaintiff’s work.126 
Similarly, the supervisor’s evaluative function exacerbates the victim’s 
experience of harassment at the supervisor’s hands.  The employee’s future 
with the employer, her pay raises, promotions, and her ability to use the 
employer as a reference for future jobs depend on getting good evaluations.  
If the harasser is the boss, who is entrusted with the power to evaluate, the 
subordinate may reasonably fear that evaluations will be colored by the 
boss’s tainted opinion of the subordinate.  If the harassment consists of 
gender or racial slurs and insults, then the subordinate may logically expect 
that the supervisor’s assessment of the subordinate’s performance will be 
colored by the low opinion the supervisor has of people in the subordinate’s 
racial or gender group.  If the harassment involves sexual demands, the 
subordinate logically assumes that the supervisor does not value her for her 
professional contributions (but instead for her sexuality) and also that denial 
 
 122. See id. at 973.  As the supervisor harasser is further removed from daily contact with 
the victim or as the supervisor harasser rises higher in the hierarchy, harassing incidents may 
become the most salient feature of the relationship between the harasser and the victim, even 
as they may become less frequent. See Hulsey v. Pride Rests., L.L.C., 367 F.3d 1238, 1248 
(11th Cir. 2004) (noting supervisory status of harasser and concomitant power to fire target 
as important considerations in the totality test); Ferris v. First Nat’l of Neb., No. 
4:04CV3286, 2006 WL 1720488, at *7 (D. Neb. June 20, 2006) (relying on Faragher for the 
proposition that supervisors who harass have power to inflict greater harm than coworkers); 
cf. Grafton v. Sears Termite & Pest Control, No. 3:98-CV-2596-R, 2000 WL 422911, at *7 
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2000) (“Age-related comments by a coworker who has no authority to 
make employment decisions, although rude and inappropriate, are not sufficient to effect a 
term condition or privilege of Plaintiff’s employment . . . .”). 
 123. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1266 (11th Cir. 1999) (Tjoflat, J., 
dissenting); Rodgers v. W.-S. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993); Steck, 365 F. 
Supp. 2d at 973–74 (citing Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535, 552 
n.14 (7th Cir. 2002)); Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155 (Mich. 1993); Taylor v. Metzger, 
706 A.2d 685 (N.J. 1998)). 
 124. Steck, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 973. 
 125. See id. at 972–73 (“This court suggests that victims are and are reasonably perceived 
to be more vulnerable to supervisor harassment, because when the harasser is a supervisor, 
the harasser may, and often does, find it easier to target and harass the victim.  For example, 
the harasser can control the circumstances under which the victim must be in his or her 
presence and can inflict retribution if the victim does not respond as desired.  The victim 
could also find it harder, and could reasonably be thought to find it harder, to object to 
supervisor harassment, either to the harasser or through other channels.  A victim of co-
worker harassment often is, and is reasonably perceived to be, much more able to object to 
harassment to a co-worker’s face, because the victim has less fear of personal, social, or 
professional consequences.”). 
 126. See id. at 975. 
516 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
of those demands may yield a negative evaluation or termination of 
employment.127 
Supervisors have the power to affect subordinates’ professional 
reputation and personal definition of professional self.  If the supervisor 
thinks negatively of the victim, then the victim, as well as others, may 
doubt her own merit.  Employees who doubt the boss’s good esteem of 
them feel defensive and less able to be assertive about performing the 
functions of the job.128  Abuse naturally causes the victim to withdraw from 
the abuser.  If the abuser is the victim’s evaluator, the victim is incapable of 
performing with the strength and assertiveness likely to garner high marks 
in a professional evaluation.129  Furthermore, if the employee avoids the 
supervisor in order to avoid harassment, the employee misses the 
opportunity to display capabilities and accomplishments that otherwise 
might lead to advancement. 
Supervisors have the power to do damage with biased or inaccurate 
information about the subordinate, and the subordinate knows that.  It is, 
after all, the supervisor’s job to assess the victim’s performance and 
contributions.  Unlike insults from a coworker, “‘[a]ny remark from [a 
supervisor] carries with it the power and authority of the office.’”130  The 
subordinate feels disempowered to object to the supervisor’s improper 
conduct because of reluctance to criticize an individual who both has 
authority in the workplace and exerts control over the subordinate’s 
employment.131  For this reason, the subordinate feels defenseless—forced 
simply to submit to the bad treatment or else to leave. 
As figures of authority, moreover, supervisors command trust and 
respect.  Our culture socializes people to look to supervisors to administer 
justice when disputes arise, to allocate resources fairly, and to maintain a 
workplace that is hospitable or at least workable.  Workers seek to live up 
to their supervisors’ expectations and win their approval.  They expect 
supervisors to deserve the trust the employer has bestowed—to be fair and 
equitable in managing the workplace.  Because of that, harm at the 
supervisor’s hands causes injury greater than harm at the hands of a stranger 
or co-equal.  There is a breach of trust, just as there is a breach of trust 
when parents abuse their children.  Thus, there is a double harm in abuse—
 
 127. In fact, if there is a negative evaluation, the victim may have a claim for quid pro 
quo harassment, which would be entirely distinct from her hostile environment claim. 
 128. See Caroline W. Jacobus, Legislative Responses to Discrimination in Women’s 
Health Care:  A Report Prepared for the Commission to Study Sex Discrimination in the 
Statutes, 16 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 153, 321 (1995) (indicating that harassment leads to self-
doubt). 
 129. Phoebe Weaver Williams chronicles the devastating effect that any harassment can 
have on professional performance. See Phoebe Weaver Williams, Performing in a Racially 
Hostile Environment, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 287, 308 & n.86 (1996). 
 130. Steck, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 970 (quoting Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 692 (N.J. 
1998)). 
 131. See generally id. 
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the abuse itself and the loss of faith in someone employees thought they 
could trust. 
Because it is usually the supervisor who is responsible for work 
conditions, there is a vast difference between the power of a supervisor to 
alter work conditions (and finding work conditions altered is what makes 
abuse actionable as harassment) and the power of a coworker without such 
responsibility.132  Whether the supervisor’s obligation to safeguard the 
workplace and its occupants is real or perceived does not matter.  What 
matters is that the supervisor has some control over the work 
environment,133 and by virtue of that control, more readily “alter[s] the 
conditions of the workplace” by harassing the target.134 
The harasser’s status as a supervisor renders abuse pervasive.  When a 
supervisor is on-site and responsible for all that goes on in the workplace, it 
is impossible for the target to ignore or escape the abuse.135  It is often 
much easier to ignore or otherwise escape abuse from a coworker.  An 
effort to escape an abusive boss always entails the risk that the victim will 
be found to be—or actually will be—insubordinate when the boss wants to 
speak.  The victim has no way of knowing whether the boss is giving a 
legitimate assignment or subjecting the victim to further abuse.  And, the 
victim will not know the answer to that question until she stands still to 
listen, by which time she will have experienced the abuse, if that is what the 
supervisor intends.  Because the supervisor has both an illegitimate and a 
legitimate function in interacting with the victim, the victim cannot just turn 
away from the supervisor whenever the supervisor approaches.  This makes 
the experience of abuse by a supervisor inescapable and pervasive. 
Because of the supervisor’s stature, abuse by a supervisor is more likely 
to be emulated by others in the workplace than would abuse by a coworker.  
Supervisor abuse “seems to authorize or condone like conduct by 
subordinates, thereby fostering a perception that the environment as a whole 
is hostile.”136  By giving permission for coworkers to harass and otherwise 
disrespect the target, supervisor abuse is likely to lead to abuse by 
coworkers.  This multiplication effect can taint the entire workplace. 
Coworkers may feel entitled to harass if they see the boss engage in such 
behavior.137  When such emulation occurs, harassment spreads and 
 
 132. Cf. Thacker & Gohmann, supra note 106, at 440. 
 133. See Estrich, supra note 14, at 855 (claiming that supervisors are “delegated the 
power to define the acceptable working conditions of the workplace”). 
 134. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 62 (2006). 
 135. See Mendoza, supra note 118, at 1987–88 (citing Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television 
Prods., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511, 519 (Ct. App. 2004), which indicates that victims of workplace 
harassment are essentially held “captive” given the existing employment relationship).  
Furthermore, “the disparity in power between the harasser and the victim exacerbates the 
employee’s captivity.” Id. at 1988. 
 136. Steck, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 972. 
 137. Thacker & Gohmann, supra note 106, at 440 (“Ultimately, a culture is created in 
which acceptance of sexually harassing behavior is the norm, and this culture further serves 
to affect psychological and emotional states of the targets who are uncomfortable with such 
behavior.”). 
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becomes commonplace, destroying the workplace for the target.138  
Because the supervisor may be ubiquitous from the target’s perspective, and 
because the supervisor empowers other harassers, supervisor abuse 
typically meets the pervasiveness requirement. 
The character of supervisor-subordinate abuse, then, necessarily yields 
greater harm to the subordinate target than coworker abuse is capable of 
yielding.  Because of power differentials, because of the supervisor’s 
fiduciary role, and because the supervisor is a role model in the workplace, 
it is safe to assume that supervisor harassment causes more harm.  For this 
reason, any assessment of the severity or pervasiveness of workplace 
harassment must consider whether the harasser is the supervisor. 
IV.  PROPOSAL—COURTS SHOULD CONSISTENTLY CONSIDER THE 
HARASSER’S IDENTITY IN ASSESSING WHETHER ABUSE IS SUFFICIENTLY 
SEVERE OR PERVASIVE TO CONSTITUTE HARASSMENT 
This proposal would increase—from one to two—the stages in 
harassment litigation when the harasser’s status as a supervisor is a required 
component of the analysis.  As explained above,139 analysis in harassment 
cases proceeds in two stages: 
Stage One:  Determination of whether harassment has occurred  
Stage Two:  Determination of whether the employer should be liable for 
proven harassment. 
Under current law,140 the identity of the harasser is a decisive factor at 
the second stage, when employer liability for proven harassment is 
assessed.  If the plaintiff proves harassment by a coworker, the employer is 
liable for that harassment only if the plaintiff also proves that the employer 
was negligent in responding or not responding to the harassment.141  If the 
plaintiff proves harassment by a supervisor, by contrast, the employer is 
presumptively liable, with the possibility of escaping liability only in the 
absence of a tangible employment action and only if the employer proves, 
in effect, that it was not negligent.142  Harasser identity is thus of paramount 
importance at the employer liability phase: 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  As explained above, whether the 
harassment is proven to have occurred turns on whether the plaintiff proves that the 
challenged behavior was (a) unwelcome, (b) motivated by the plaintiff’s national origin, sex, 
or other protected trait (race, age, etc.) and (c) sufficiently severe or pervasive to (d) alter a 
term, condition, or privilege of employment. See supra note 30.  As argued above, the severe 
or pervasive analysis requires consideration of whether the harasser is the victim’s 
supervisor. 
 141. See Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 338 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing 
EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 518 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
 142. See Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 767 (2d Cir. 1998).  That 
presumption is rebuttable only if the harassment did not culminate in a tangible employment 
action, an analysis not relevant here. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 
760–61 (1998). 
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If harasser is a coworker, employer is liable only if negligent. 
If harasser is a supervisor, employer is liable, though may sometimes 
invoke an affirmative defense. 
The primacy given to harasser identity at the liability phase does not 
obviate the need to give it a pivotal role in Stage One, in the analysis of 
whether harassment has occurred.  Frequently, failure to consider the 
harasser’s identity as supervisor results in a finding that harassment has not 
occurred.  Such cases never reach the employer liability phase, so the 
question of harasser identity never receives scrutiny.  The two analyses are 
thus entirely independent of each other, and the strength of a showing on 
one cannot compensate for weakness in the other.  The proposal of this 
Essay is that supervisory status of the abuser should be given strong weight 
at the first part of the analysis, when occurrence of harassment is assessed. 
 
